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Book Review: The Metaethics of Constitutional Adjudication, by Boško Tripković 
Kyle L. Murray* 
 
1. Metaethics and Constitutional Theory 
Constitutional scholars are used to questions like: “Did the court get it wrong in that assisted suicide 
case?”; “How should freedom of expression be balanced against other moral concerns”; “Was Roe v 
Wade the ‘right’ decision?” etc. At another level, we are used to endless debates about the 
appropriate role of the courts in a democracy, particularly concerning their involvement in moral 
disputes: should they get involved, and if so, how far should they be able to go?1 This book takes a 
different step. As the blurb puts it, ‘[i]nstead of asking whether the courts get moral answers wrong, 
the book asks a more fundamental question: do the courts get the morality itself wrong?’ In giving 
detailed attention to this more fundamental issue, Tripković’s work presents an interesting, engaging 
and potentially valuable contribution to the literature on constitutional adjudication.  
Its value may extend further in establishing a useful bridge between metaethics, on the one side, and 
constitutional theory on the other. The implicit idea is that interrogating the interaction between core 
philosophy and constitutional theory is an important task. This is something I respectfully share: those 
engaged in constitutional theory ‘must think, and think carefully, about the philosophical implications 
and background’ of their work.2 Tripković’s book can be read as taking this challenge to the door of 
constitutional courts, whom he charges with under-reflecting ‘on the source of moral value behind 
their judgment[s]’, even where they admit making moral judgements at all (2). The result is ‘confusion 
and uncertainty about the nature of value in comparative constitutional adjudication’ (2). Thus, 
engaging with the metaethics of constitutional adjudication does indeed seem a valuable pursuit.  
Another aspect of the book that immediately catches the eye is the anti-realist conception of value it 
takes – ‘one that does not presuppose the existence of mind-independent moral truths’ (blurb). Put 
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bluntly, moral anti-realism does not have a shining reputation in the legal academy. For example, 
Dworkin dedicated much of his career, up to his final work, developing something of a polemic against 
it. On his view, moral anti-realism is, at best, a uselessly debilitating viewpoint, and at worst, a 
‘denigrating’ suggestion risking undermining our ability to ‘live decent, worthwhile lives’.3 Beyond the 
legal academy, Strauss was concerned that accepting anti-realism would lead to the breakdown of 
‘civilised life’.4 As Tripković is attuned to in some of his arguments, this unease is still widespread.  
Many have taken up the ‘mission’, as one commentator describes it, ‘to save the world from the 
horrible acts that are supposed to result when people become moral skeptics of any variety’.5 In this 
climate, any attempt to defend and apply an anti-realist perspective, particularly in constitutional 
theory, is to be welcomed.  
With this in mind, and noting that I may have gotten carried away in my own anti-realist excitement, 
I must admit that it was somewhat disappointing to find this immediate qualification of the scope of 
the work:  
Whereas it would be inaccurate to describe this project as a moral reading of constitution [sic] 
for moral skeptics, it certainly is a moral reading that is more cautious about presupposing 
mind-independently true moral answers, and even more cautious about developing a theory 
of constitutional interpretation from that metaethical premise. (7 – my emphasis) 
Perhaps those of us so inclined will have to wait for that sceptical approach to constitutional 
adjudication. Regardless, Tripković’s own philosophical leanings are clearly on the non-realist side of 
the spectrum, and it is refreshing to see this brought to constitutional theory in some sense. It is also 
to be welcomed that Tripković does take care to explain exactly what he purports to offer in such a 
careful manner.  
Broadly, he aims to ‘challenge and explain the metaethical foundations of value-based arguments in 
constitutional adjudication’ (2). Tripković seeks to achieve this by, first, teasing out the ‘implicit 
commitments about the nature of value’ within existing methods of value-based constitutional 
adjudication (2-3). He then provides a philosophical scrutiny of these commitments, before offering a 
more ‘plausible constitutional ethics’ – ‘a theory of ethical argument in constitutional adjudication 
that would be supported by a sound understanding of value’ (6). 
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I offer some critical reflections on the scope of the work, its method, and some of its key arguments 
in Section 4 below. First, however, a brief summary of how the argument proceeds is in order. This is 
followed by a more detailed reconstruction of its themes. 
2. An Overview  
The first three substantive chapters are each dedicated to a different method of value-based 
constitutional adjudication Tripković identifies in current judicial approaches. Chapter 2 concerns itself 
with the argument from “constitutional identity”, treating the ‘common evaluative commitments of 
the society as articulated in the constitution’ as the source of value (16). Chapter 3 deals with 
arguments which appeal to less “deep”, currently prevailing ‘moral intuitions of citizens’ within the 
constitutional order (16) – “common sentiment”. On this approach, the ‘moral sentiments of the 
people in a particular community constitute the right solution to moral problems’ (59). Chapter 4 turns 
to the argument from “universal reason”, focussing on values which exist ‘by virtue of our humanity’ 
(16). 
In each case, Tripković begins by carefully sketching the features of the approach at hand. This is 
provided via an analysis of its use in three systems, with concrete examples from a wide range of case 
law. Each chapter then deconstructs and critiques their underlying metaethical commitments. This 
pleasingly methodical structure certainly helps with one of the tasks of the book: to interrogate 
existing value-based arguments used by courts in constitutional adjudication. These chapters also 
serve as a ground-clearing exercise for the central argument that follows: in each case, Tripković 
diagnoses deficiencies in the conceptions of value taken, which, in the final constructive part of the 
book, he seeks to remedy with his own account. 
Chapter 5 lays down the groundwork for this constructive task. Returning to core philosophy, the aim 
is to ‘articulate a philosophical foundation for a theory of constitutional ethics’ (143). This chapter is 
where the main burden of the book lies – it is the key turning point in the argument and sees several 
strands of the critical analysis thus far come together in elaborating Tripković’s own metaethical 
stance. It is also here that the method and philosophical background of this book, implicit throughout, 
is exposed particularly clearly.  
At this point, the ground-clearing and ground-laying work has been done. The final substantive chapter 
has the task of putting the theory of value to work in the realm of constitutional ethics – to place it in 
‘the institutional context of judicial reasoning’ (192). While the work which follows is presented as 
(merely?) an issue of ‘translation’ (193), it is vital; it completes the journey from constitutional 




3. Key Themes and Arguments 
Tripković offers a combination of analytical, critical and reconstructive contributions, broadly 
corresponding to the structure of the book, above. 
3.1. Analytical Elements 
The taxonomy of current value-based arguments in constitutional adjudication arising out of the first 
three chapters seems a helpful contribution to the literature. In addition to the broad categorisation 
of styles of reasoning drawn from comparative adjudication, Tripković elaborates some more precise 
distinctions. For example, he differentiates “general” (53-56) and “particular” (50-53) forms of 
“constitutional identity” to which judges often refer. Such contributions will certainly assist those 
concerned with judicial engagement with morality in their work, providing helpful framing language 
and some solid analytical groundwork on the content of these methods, and their underlying 
metaethical commitments. This is heightened by the fact that Tripković examines a range of 
jurisprudence with a careful and interrogating style. Indeed, the whole host of implicit claims about 
morality that Tripković manages to dig out of some apparently innocuous judicial statements is 
entertaining at times (see his treatment of the US Supreme Court test for “cruel and unusual” (23)).  
3.2. Critical Elements 
The core of the critical work comes from Tripković’s discussion of existing approaches, their present 
metaethical underpinnings, and the way they operate. As one might expect, the criticism of each 
approach differs, but one strand which catches them all is that is that none of the three methods of 
dealing with values in constitutional adjudication can, or should, operate in isolation from the others. 
For example, Chapter 2 ‘challenges the notion that constitutional identity can serve as an independent 
foundation of judicial moral judgment’ (14). Similarly, in light of the problems Tripković finds in the 
argument from common sentiment in Chapter 3, he argues that it ought to be ‘supplement[ed]’ by 
the argument from universal reason – reconstructed to avoid dubious references to mind-
independent truths (98). 
The criticisms made of the common sentiment approach demonstrate well a style of argument that 
recurs throughout the book and which will be the subject of much of the commentary I offer below. 
As above, Tripković argues that this approach should not be taken as a singular, wholesale approach 
to value-based constitutional adjudication. The reason he initially gives is that ‘when other types of 
argument’ are excluded, it ‘loses much of its appeal because it does not capture the way moral 
questions need to be approached’ (60). It ‘does not leave space for reflective endorsement and 
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justification of our moral feelings’ (60). Immediately, one is tempted to ask for some indication of why 
“reflective endorsement” is needed. The underlying problem for Tripković is the implausibility of the 
common sentiment approach’s undergirding emotivist and relativist metaethics (these commitments 
are drawn out on 80-89). This metaethics is implausible in light of the way “we” regard “our” moral 
principles in “our” discourse.  
The instinct of the emotivist, that in moral evaluation we ‘express our emotions only’, is problematic 
because it ‘fails to account for the role of reflection and reasoning in our moral talk’ (91). Their view 
‘cannot account for the ways in which morality actually functions’ (92). This is an early glance at a style 
of argument that comes to feature heavily in this book: the technique is to appeal to what “we” 
currently think, or how we talk in “our” culture. This might aptly be summarised as a reflective 
equilibrium, or perhaps an ethnocentrism. The challenge Tripković lays down for those attracted to 
relativism and emotivism is ‘to explain the role of moral reasoning in our practice’ (92). The problem, 
we are told, is that: 
Resolving moral questions…does not simply amount to counting our common feelings on the 
matter. We think of our moral judgments as justified when we are able to offer an argument 
for them starting from a value…and using the basic rules of moral reasoning. (92) 
Tripković also wants to remind us that, when we say things like ‘“What Hitler did to Jews was wrong”’, 
we ‘do not imply that it is our feeling now that these conducts were wrong’ (93). Rather, we condemn 
this ‘because we think they were wrong’, full stop (93). Presumably, we think they are just wrong 
because this is the result of our reasoning and reflective techniques. A further aspect of the criticism, 
then, is that the lack of reason and reflection on the emotivist account fails to support ‘the objectivity 
of moral talk’ (85) – ‘the illusion of moral objectivity’ we rely on in our discourse (95).  
One might think this is a rather peculiar line to take against the emotivist. Tripković, in effect, appears 
to be insisting that the emotivist explain, perhaps even support, the illusion of objectivity or else have 
their metaethics and resulting constitutional approach rejected. But is not the very point of emotivism 
that such beliefs in objective morality are misguided? Why is it the emotivist who must give way to 
accommodate the (deluded?) objectivists – to, in a sense, humour their illusion of “objectivity”? I 
suspect the answer again comes down to the ethnocentric standard of justification that Tripković 
deploys: the plausibility of a theory depends on its ability to explain our intuitions, and the way we 
talk. If the emotivist cannot, that becomes a problem.  
3.3. (Re)Constructive Elements 
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Having criticised existing approaches and their underlying conceptions of value by now, Tripković 
begins his constructive work. While, as above, he initially describes his task as to set out ‘a theory of 
ethical argument in constitutional adjudication that would be supported by a sound understanding of 
value’ (6 – my emphases), it becomes clearer that his, more modest, aim is to provide a theory which 
can explain current uses of ethical argument in constitutional adjudication in an attractive way. Thus, 
at the end of Chapter 4 he lays down the challenge ahead: arguments from common sentiment and 
constitutional identity ‘depend on contingent moral attitudes’, and the argument from universal 
reason, on Tripković’s account, brings in a reflective attitude which is contingently considered by us 
to be ‘beneficial to a good moral judgment’ (141). The challenge is that there remains something of a 
normative gap – why does it matter that these contingent attitudes are held in fact? Without it, a 
robust theory of ethical constitutional adjudication cannot get off the ground. Thus: 
…to motivate the use of these ethical arguments in constitutional reasoning, we need a 
conception of value that will vindicate our ability to rely on our contingent moral attitudes 
even if they do not lead to mind-independent moral truths. (141) 
Notice that the goal is not to put anti-realism to work to construct a theory of adjudication suitable 
for the sceptic. Rather it is to explain our current approaches in a way which is attractive to the moral 
sceptic. This difference might seem subtle. However, it is, I submit, a significant one and gives rise to 
many of the critical reflections offered below. Having laid down this marker, let us now look at what 
this reconstructive work looks like. 
It begins with the return to philosophical foundations in Chapter 5. Tripković first attempts to vindicate 
a conception of value before offering a translation into constitutional ethics. It is perhaps 
understandable, given the considerable burden of this chapter for the book, that it ends up as the 
most complex and challenging. Many strands of argument which have been hanging from earlier 
chapters are drawn together, and it is here that we really start to appreciate much of what has been 
going on thus far in a conceptually precise way. I certainly understood much of the previous discussion 
better upon reading this section. Key to much of what follows, and what has gone before, is a 
distinction between the “practical” and “theoretical” perspectives. Again, we are told that in the 
practical realm of deciding what to do, ‘our values seem to us, and we present them to others, as true’ 
(145). In our moral evaluations, the meaning of the concept of ‘“wrong”’, for example, ‘seems to be 
fixed by its reference, the episode in the world that our moral judgment is about’ (145).  Thus, when 
we say things like ‘“cruelty is wrong”’, we are ‘thereby seemingly describing an occurrence in the world 
as having a property of wrongness’, regardless of contingent attitudes – it is just wrong. It is perhaps 
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rather surprising to find that, on Tripković’s account, even sceptics seem to be implying all of this when 
they evaluate. 
Yet in the theoretical realm, we explain our value experiences as causally affected attitudes, referring 
to evolution, history, culture and other explanations. This raises the spectre that there may be other 
reasons for our values that, despite how we like to talk about them, might have nothing to do with 
their (independent) truth after all. This results in a ‘profound psychological uneasiness’ (145). Tripković 
is right that the idea that our moral evaluations might not be independently true is daunting to many. 
The trend I described in the introduction is further testament to that. The dilemma, with which 
Tripković seems to share considerable sympathy is this: ‘how can we go on claiming objectivity and 
truth for our values without having a bad philosophical conscience’? (146) One might ask whether this 
worry is worth humouring at all, or whether it is time to throw such metaphysical blankets6  aside and 
try a bit of intellectual honesty. On the other hand, the problem that Tripković has identified is a real 
and pressing one for many, so perhaps one should think carefully first. 
After dismissing several methods of coping with the problem, Tripković presents his own. And here, 
finally, we have the argument for Tripković’s version of anti-realism, of which we have seen only 
glimpses so far. The argument is a multi-faceted and nuanced one. Tripković’s claim is not that there 
are no external truths, but rather that ‘the best causal accounts of the origins of our current values 
show that they are a consequence of contingent circumstances rather than the perception of external 
and absolute ethical truths’ (152). This does not in itself prove the absence of independent truth, but 
it does show a gap between the ‘realm of objective values (if there are any) and our existing values’, 
which, in his view, is to blame for the paralysing thought above: the worry that our evaluations are 
not likely to be the result of objective truth, and so are likely to be wrong, or, equally worryingly, that 
we might never know (153). 
Tripković uses a detailed Darwinian argument to show that evolutionary accounts, for one, are more 
plausible than realism in explaining our values. Not only that, but it can also explain why we talk as 
though our values are objective: it is helpful, in evolutionary terms, for us to believe in the illusion of 
objectivity (154ff) (recall that the inability to explain the illusion of objectivity was a defect found in 
emotivism). While a hardcore Darwinian account of morality is, perhaps, not for everyone, it is 
certainly a well-told story, and Tripković offers some provoking arguments to support it. 
 
If Tripković had left matters there, however, he would surely have, contrary to his intentions, increased 
the metaphysical angst of the disappointed objectivists. On his account, we still want to have objective 
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truth on our side. Showing us that we likely do not only exacerbates this worry: we are even more sure 
that we cannot do what we think we ought to. However, Tripković does offer a solution. Essentially, 
he counsels us to “drop” the idea causing the unease. Thus, we need to stop worrying about external 
truth and realise that ‘one need not know mind-independent truths to know how to live’ (176). 
Tripković wants us to have confidence in what we do have – our identities, and our values, however 
contingent they may be. But, in order to continue evaluating in a useful way, and to temper excessive 
confidence, ‘we need some other approach to judging these intuitions as warranted or trustworthy’ 
(181). This is the role Tripković finds for reflection – ‘ideas about the virtues of good moral judgment’ 
(174) (recall that the inability to explain our current reflective approach was another defect in existing 
accounts).  
 
This argument – that attachment to external truth as an idea is doing us more harm than good – is a 
strikingly pragmatic one.7 Indeed Tripković very briefly notes some similarity in the attitude of 
reflective confidence he proposes and seminal pragmatist Richard Rorty’s ‘“liberal ironist”’,8 but 
points out that his own approach is ‘very different in the details and doctrines that support it’ (174, 
n105). We are left to work out for ourselves what these differences are, but, considering the 
thoroughly pragmatic nature of the argument Tripković ends up using, and other similarities noted 
below, I wonder whether there is as much of a difference as he makes out.  
 
Armed by now with a philosophically-grounded theory of value, Tripković resolves matters by 
translating it into the constitutional realm. On the model he proposes: 
[J]udicial moral inquiry proceeds from the emotive intuitions of a constitutional 
community present in the argument from common sentiment; these intuitions are then 
challenged with the argument from universal reason through reflective exposure to 
different moral perspectives; finally, the goal of this exercise is to contribute to a better 
understanding and development of constitutional identity. (224) 
 
4. Critical Reflections  
There is something immediately satisfying in the way the book ties together here: Tripković’s 
pragmatically-defended conception of value rides in to “cure” the defects with those drawn from 
existing approaches to constitutional adjudication, and he issues a broad instruction to courts about 
                                                          
7 See, for example, R Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin Books 1999) 48–49 (denouncing the idea of 
objective truth as ’something unknowable’). 
8 See especially R Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge University Press 1989) pt II. 
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how to use these approaches, finding a role for each. He certainly fulfils the task set for himself (as 
qualified): to reconstruct current approaches to constitutional adjudication according to his preferred 
metaethics. That said, in this section I offer some critical reflections on the nature and content of this 
project. 
4.1. Scope  
While the way the argument comes together is very neat, stepping back and looking at everything in 
place, a lurking dissatisfaction creeps in. The plausible theory of constitutional ethics we were 
promised has materialised as a refurbished version of what the courts have already been doing, on his 
account. Tripković seems to have come to the project of establishing a philosophically rigorous 
approach to constitutional ethics mainly with the aim of “fixing” the current approaches of the courts. 
But a question which stayed with me throughout is this: why go to such effort to do this, one might 
suggest, rather modest task? Why assume the current approaches of the courts are worth fixing in the 
first place? At times, it is as though the conception of value Tripković comes to is to be accepted simply 
because it allows us to praise the current approaches of the courts, but I wonder whether this puts 
matters the wrong way around: why mould the theory to the practice? Why not develop a theory of 
value and explore where it might lead us? Why does the conception of value have to be able to explain 
existing approaches, rather than future approaches having to change – potentially quite radically – 
according to a better conception of value? 
Tripković is somewhat aware of this concern: he recognises that the theory ‘leaves many things as 
they are’, and ‘only finds a distinct place for ethical arguments that already exist in comparative 
practice’ (221). His response is that it nonetheless ‘does unsettle the usual ways in which these issues 
are addressed’ (221). As an example of this ‘performative potential’, Tripković’s model rejects the 
current tendency to treat the three value-based arguments exclusively (221). But this re-raises the 
original concern: why limit the transformative potential to these modest adjustments? If the courts 
really have been “getting morality wrong”, why assume they have been getting their methods of 
adjudication even broadly right? If, on the other hand, Tripković’s point is that his theory of value can, 
in its own right, justify current approaches, so that they are worth holding on to, then perhaps this 
positive normative stance ought to be emphasised more. The problem is that all of this has been tied 
to explaining existing approaches, as though doing so successfully itself has normative force. Some 
might question this, almost conservative, account of justification.  
4.2. Ethnocentrism  
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This aspect of the book might simply be a consequence of a broader feature. As noted at various points 
above, claims regarding “our” intuitions, “our” culture, or the way “we” talk about morality play a 
central role in the book. It is littered with such ethnocentric references and it is striking that this is 
present both in the key arguments Tripković makes for his approach, and in the substance of the model 
proposed. As he envisages, judicial enquiry starts with the ‘emotive intuitions of a constitutional 
community’, tested through engaging with values from other systems and corrected where doing so 
would ‘contribute to a better understanding and development of constitutional identity’ (224). Thus, 
judges ought to start and finish with the “we” of a constitutional community; the ethnocentric 
approach goes all the way down, up, and back again in this book. 
The routine invoking of references to “our” intuitions; how “we” talk about morality and praising an 
approach in which courts will appeal to “our” collective intuitions, is again reminiscent of Rorty’s 
thought – this time his unabashed ethnocentrism. Rorty became infamous for such appeals to ‘our 
culture’9; ‘our society’ and its ‘traditions’10; ‘our community’,11 and the ‘convictions to which we are 
already committed by the public, shared vocabulary we use in daily life’.12 While Tripković does not 
attach himself to a particular substantive political philosophy as Rorty does with Rawlsian political 
liberalism13, they both share this pragmatic ethnocentric approach. Rorty finds that political liberalism 
is the most appropriate philosophy for “us”; Tripković finds, first, that his non-realist reflective 
confidence is more appropriate given the way “we” talk about morality while also avoiding dubious 
metaphysics, and recommending that a judge take this reflective “we”-based approach to 
constitutional adjudication.  
Given these similarities, perhaps a more substantive engagement with Rortyan theory, or pragmatic 
philosophy more generally, would be useful. Tripković would seem to have allies in these quarters. 
More critically, however, doing so would present an opportunity to engage with many of the criticisms 
that have been made of such “we”-based approaches. Indeed, as Rorty himself quickly noticed, many 
‘have been annoyed’ by this style of argument.14 It is worth reflecting on these criticisms, lest Tripković 
                                                          
9 ibid 57. 
10 R Rorty, ‘Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism’ (1983) 80(10) Journal of Philosophy 583, 585. 
11 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (fn8) 59. 
12 ibid xiv. And many more besides. For a more complete treatment of the role the “we so-and-so” reference 
plays in Rorty’s work, see G Baruchello and R Weber, ‘“Who Are We?” On Rorty, Rhetoric, and Politics’ (2014) 
19(2) The European Legacy 197. 
13 See, for example R Rorty, ‘Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein’ (1987) 15 Political Theory 564, 565–566; 
R Rorty, ‘The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy’ in M Peterson and R Vaughan (eds), The Virginia Statute of 
Religious Freedom (Cambridge University Press 1988). 
14 Rorty, ‘Thugs and Theorists’ (fn13) 564. 
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risk similarly annoying. Not doing so, I think, risks leaving some areas of weakness considering the 
foundational role the approach plays in both method and substance here. 
a) “Who Are We?” 
The most problematic issue is the question of who, precisely, “we” are in these ethnocentric appeals. 
While Tripkovic often invokes these “we”s, and “our”s, exactly who this refers to is usually left 
unelaborated. ‘Who’, as Bernstein asked Rorty, ‘precisely constitutes this “we”?’15 Sure, from the 
arguments Tripković uses these references to support, readers can probably work out what the “we” 
is supposed to believe, but exactly who “we” are is less clear. 
One issue with this is that it makes it rather difficult to assess whether the pictures painted by Tripković 
are accurate characterisations of what “we” do believe. A momentary flash of a somewhat 
recognisable ethnos comes in a footnote, referring to respecting normative intuitions ‘to the extent 
that they can be reflectively attributed to our identity as persons living in democratic polities at the 
beginning of the 21st century’ (see 192, n1), but even this still seems vague. Perhaps, then, this 
fundamental question is worth reflecting upon further.  
b) Disagreement 
However, the danger is that greater clarity in this regard will likely lay bare the fact that many disagree. 
As Bernstein argues, to point to ‘“social practices,” “shared beliefs,” a “historical consensus”’, or, one 
might add, “our constitutional identity” is to ‘point to a tangled area of controversy’.16 The 
‘overwhelming historical fact is that individuals’ basic intuitions conflict’.17 Has Tripković managed to 
pick out the ones “we” genuinely share for his key arguments? That would be quite a feat given the 
pervasiveness of disagreement in our everyday lives18 (I, for one, do not ascribe to the “illusion of 
objectivity” Tripković wants to explain, and certainly do not mean to suggest that “wrongness” is a 
property of events in the world when I morally evaluate, as he suggests). 
The issue goes also to the content of Tripković’s constitutional ethics: if the judge is tasked with 
engaging with “our” fundamental constitutional identity (as tweaked through references to common 
sentiment and a reconstructed version of universal reason), then they will be tasked with taking sides 
in these interpretive disputes. What happens, or should happen, when people disagree with the 
interpretation of “we”, or perhaps simply do not ascribe to the intuitions of the “we” at all, is thus 
                                                          
15 RJ Bernstein, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward: Richard Rorty on Liberal Democracy and Philosophy’ 
(1987) 15 Political Theory 538, 554. 
16 ibid 552. 
17 ibid 550. 
18 See generally Waldron, Law and Disagreement (fn1). 
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another issue worthy of reflection. Some might take issue with the blunt suggestion that if “we” come 
across conflicting intuitions, it is time to consider whether it is ‘justified in this particular case to force 
others into our own worldview, to impose our own identity on them’ (188-189). The unsavoury, 
exclusory and domineering elements of ethnocentrism rear their head with suggestions like these; 
considerable power is given to those who define the “we” and which aspects of “our” identity ought 
to be maintained – imposed.  
c) Legitimacy  
This takes matters down into the depths of legitimacy and more familiar debates surrounding judicial 
power. Tripković does note that there are often a multitude of competing identities and opinions and 
that there is a need to consider the appropriate role of the courts in these circumstances (194). Aware 
of the legitimacy issues at stake, Tripković holds that the courts ought to ‘respect public opinion’, and, 
‘[i]nstead of imposing their own evaluative attitudes’ need to regard themselves as ‘the guardians of 
reflectiveness’, with an appropriate nod to the process theory of Ely (194 – 195).19 
But while Tripković is somewhat aware of the issue, and signals some need for judicial restraint, I 
wonder how robust this settlement can be as a response to legitimacy concerns given that he also 
suggests that the identity and views of the people for which the courts decide is just a starting point. 
The courts may diverge not only where “the people” are insufficiently reflective, but also where they 
are held to stray from the moral values embedded in “our” constitutional identity (194). Someone has 
to decide what in fact does stray from this identity, and, necessarily, what this “we” involves in the 
first place. Presumably, this will be the court.  
How confident can we be, then, that the legitimacy issues surrounding judicial imposition do not 
return under the guise of protecting apparently “better”, “more accurate” conceptions of what “we” 
believe? It is lucky, I suppose, that (so we are told) ‘much of our contingent intuitions about the way 
in which moral problems ought to be resolved in modern political communities point to democratic 
representation as the most appropriate institutional venue’ (195). Let us hope the courts see it so. 
Regardless, a little more on the mechanisms of putting this judicial approach into practice would help. 
Perhaps working out exactly how it should operate, in order to maintain a suitable balance between 
the corrective role envisaged for the courts and their restrained role of protecting reflection, is an 
avenue for future research. 
 
                                                          
19 See Ely (fn1). 
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5. Final Reflections  
It is hoped that the above provides a fair summary of the key themes at play in this complex, thought-
provoking work. Overall, this book has much to offer. It reminds us of the importance of reflecting 
upon the philosophical underpinnings of constitutional theory and provides some conceptual analysis 
which will be of use for that task and beyond. Its own philosophical arguments are interesting and 
engaging, even if there are further reflections to be had concerning some of the core assumptions and 
methods. In particular, the ethnocentric mindset running throughout is, in my view, worthy of careful 
reflection. It is the key to much of this work, but, as we have seen, also raises a whole host of further 
issues, which if under addressed put both the persuasiveness and attractiveness of the theory at risk.  
 
